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21 May 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 18/81)



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EGYPT

DOMESTIC ELECTION RIGGING LAID BARE

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 3-9 Apr 81 pp 34, 35

/Article: "Local 'Democracy' in the Egyptian Governorates: Electoral 'Normalization'"/

/Text/ The Egyptian regime has devised a new way to crush the opposition in local assembly elections in the governorates. The dispute between the opposition parties and the ruling National Party on this subject has reached its peak. This is the story in detail as narrated by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's correspondent in Cairo.

The dispute currently flaring up between the opposition parties and the ruling National Party on the system of local assembly elections is not a secondary one; rather, it is essential, and is considered an extension of the existing disputes in views of the two sides regarding the issue of democracy.

The Consultative Assembly here has agreed to the system bearing on local assembly elections, in accordance with the system of lists and the absolute majority of votes. The Consultative Assembly decision occurred in the wake of the debate on Local Government Law 43 for 1979, in application of the provisions of the constitution following the latest amendments which stipulate that the various drafts of basic laws complementing the constitution, including the draft local government law, be handed over to the Consultative Assembly which will express opinions on them.

The Consultative Assembly insisted that the local assembly elections be based on the system of lists (bills) and an absolute majority whereby the whole list of the party getting 51 percent of the votes wins. At the same time, it also declared its rejection of the opposition draft that elections take place by the system of lists with proportional representation, which would enable every political party participating in the elections to win a number of seats equal to the percentage of votes the party obtained in the elections. This means that other parties, which might obtain 49 percent of the votes in the elections, would not be represented.

It is worth pointing out that the opposition political parties were the first to demand that the system of election by lists be endorsed, in the wake of the general People's Assembly elections in 1979, the excesses which were revealed to have taken place in these elections and the interventions officials made to make the ruling National Party candidates succeed.

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The first time an election was held by list and absolute majority was in the Consultative Assembly elections of July 1980 (the assembly contains 210 members, two-thirds of whom were by election and one-third of whom were appointed by the president). This was after the majority of the members of the People's Assembly, who belong to the National Party, approved the law bearing on the Consultative Assembly. In addition, the ruling National Party prepared and presented it, and the National Party set out an additional restriction which may be summarized by the fact that a party which does not obtain 5 percent of the total votes in the governorates of the Arab Republic of Egypt will not obtain any seats in the Consultative Assembly, even if one of its candidate lists in a governorate wins. This is considered a precedent the likes of which democracy has not previously witnessed.

At that time the opposition parties declared their refusal to take part in the Consultative Assembly elections, except for the right-wing Socialist Liberal Party; that, at first, declared its refusal to participate in the elections then changed its mind and decided to take part in the elections alongside the ruling National Party. The other opposition parties' anticipation became reality when all the Liberal Party candidates to the elections lost. The Liberal Party was compensated for its stand and its abstention from the position of the other opposition parties when President al-Sadat appointed five Liberal Party leaders to the Consultative Assembly, including Mustafa Kamil Murad, head of the party.

It appears that the Liberal Party benefitted from this painful experience, since it recently declared that it would stand alongside the other opposition parties in opposing the system of election by list and absolute majority which the ruling National Party wants.

The Government Looks for a Cover

The statement in which the Socialist Labor Party called for non-participation in the Consultative Assembly elections noted "The National Party obstinately maintains that Consultative Assembly elections should take place in the manner it has devised, which has not previously been applied in any country. The government which is to hold the elections is a party government formed by the National Democratic Party with ministers in the party who dominate the agencies which will supervise and run the elections. Above and beyond that, the governors of all governorates in Egypt belong to the ruling party, and the National Party government dominates all the media and has assumed total control of the headquarters of the Arab Socialist Union, which has been eliminated. In the face of all these obstacles, as a consequence of which the National Party, to the exclusion of the other political parties, may alone be assured of obtaining seats to the Consultative Assembly, the Socialist Labor Party warns that this will lead citizens to feel despair over the success of the fledgling experiment in democracy, and could lead to dominance by the single party ruling regime, over constitutional life, with all the tragedies, excesses and dangers that entails. The Socialist Labor Party most sorrowfully declares that it is compelled to boycott the Consultative Assembly elections."

The statement issued by the National Progressive Unificationist Grouping Party said, "The whole world is acquainted with the systems of elections: individual

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election or election by lists with proportional representation. The advantage of the proportional list is that it gives political parties, forces and blocs a real representation equal to the percentage of votes that each list obtains. However, our government has chosen a system for elections which must be considered a new invention no less innovative than that of considering the press to be a fourth estate, and it has eliminated proportional representation. This means that the ruling party list has triumphed completely, there is no possibility for any other party to work its way in, and the Consultative Assembly has become a new kind of dictatorship of the ruling party. To that one should add the masses' current rejection and refusal to acknowledge what is called the Consultative Assembly and the nature of this assembly, which is distinguished from any parliamentary, or trade union assembly or even philanthropic society by having no role in decisionmaking or in serving the interests of the masses and defending their rights, and has no connection with the masses.

"Thus the party made its decision not to participate; this is a realistic necessity which underlines the validity of the party's position in principle, especially since the authorities are trying, through these elections--whose results are determined in advance--to obtain a fraudulent popular endorsement confirming the publicity it is spreading concerning its overwhelming majority. Our party is not agreeing to help give the authorities this cover, which it needs to present to its allies in order to continue its policies, which are rejected by the people of Egypt."

In the light of the opposition's previous experiences with the government of the ruling National Party, the opposition's fears seem to be opposite as regards elections to the People's Assembly and the Consultative Assembly, not to mention the series of laws restricting freedoms, the latest of which is the ruling National Party's declared intention to form an official internal opposition next May, eliminating the single party.

It is worth pointing out that the local assembly elections which took place in November 1979 ended, in most of the governorates, with the victory of a large number of opposition party members, especially people belonging to the National Progressive Unificationist Grouping Party and the Socialist Labor Party, in addition to a large number of independent national and progressive elements who enjoyed the confidence of the voters in spite of the various forms of pressure, administrative interference and abrogation proceedings brought to bear against opposition party candidates and independent national elements. These various national forces exercise their activities in local councils at the service of the masses' interests, raise objections to the improper actions of certain agencies and stand up to deviations within the governorates. They face various forms of pressure in the form of threats or enticements and they struggle to make a living; examples are numerous, and the opposition newspapers discuss them constantly. This reveals that the true reason for the Consultative Assembly's insistence on adhering to the system of elections by list and an absolute majority is to remove these national opposition forces from the local councils in the coming elections and to bring about ruling National Democratic Party dominance in all areas. This was not hidden by the newspaper MAYU, organ of the ruling National Democratic Party, which said in response to the objections the opposition political parties raised to this law, "The opposition declares that the National Party will obtain various seats in the local councils if elections are carried out by lists and by absolute majority. This is natural, because it is majority rule, and the basis of democratic rule is that the majority should rule and that the minority should oppose." (MAYU, 16 March 1981.)

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It appears that presenting matters in this light is a deception which is in contradiction with the reality of the case and objective truth. It is as if the opposition is debating or opposing majority rule and not the violation of the democratic principle that gives parties and political blocs a real representation which is equivalent to the percentage of votes each list has obtained. A phenomenon is this regard which was brought out by the discussions within the Consultative Assembly on the system of local administrative council elections, which the newspaper AL-AHRAR also mentioned (16 March 1981), is that no less than 30 National Party members voted alongside the Liberal Party members against the system of election by list and absolute majority, thus going against the trend of the majority of the party led by Fikri Makram 'Ubayd, the deputy prime minister for national party affairs /sic/, and Counsellor Hilmi 'Abd-al-Akhir, minister of People's Assembly affairs.

Who Knows What the List Is!

Under the title "The List, and Who Knows What the List Is!" 'Abd-al-Mughni Sa'id, member of the Higher Committee of the Socialist Labor Party (AL-SHA'B 17 March 1981) wrote, in condemning the Consultative Assembly decree: "We here in Egypt are a nation of wonders. In the latest Consultative Assembly elections we pursued an innovative system which is unique of its kind--the system of the absolute majority. As a result, the ruling party has monopolized all the seats in the Consultative Assembly. This result has gladdened the government and its National Democratic Party, and it has decided to put this strange electoral system in general applications so that it can be applied in elections to the People's Assembly and the local councils, which are all elected. Thanks to the overwhelming powers of accomplishment which Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, chairman of the Consultative Assembly, showed in getting the press bill approved, he was also put in charge of getting the amendment to the Election Law and the amendment to the Party Law passed by the Consultative Assembly as soon as possible. Naturally, ruling party circles will beat the drum for the draft amendment, and the trumpets of the domestic press will join them.

"Whatever protest liberal citizens might make, and whatever protest opposition parties might make, the draft amendments will be approved and will be imposed on the Egyptian political community under the slogan of democracy which the dictatorship of the majority raises unabashedly and without obstruction! It is only in our power to warn sincere people about the danger of playing with fire in this manner, which will have the effect of eliminating our democratic experiment and paving the way to other alternatives of uncertain consequences.

"A regime which imposes such a method cannot succeed and cannot endure long. Isma'il Sidqi in the early thirties of this century set forth a new constitution, amended the election law and formed a ruling party which had its headquarters, committees and daily newspaper. In spite of all that, his government, his party and his parliament did not last long; in less than 5 years they all collapsed irrevocably, and the victory went to the free people, the source of power and the sovereign entity!"

Similarly, the newspaper AL-AHRAR, spokesman of the right-wing Socialist Liberal Party, devoted the editorial in its 16 March 1981 issue, written by party chairman Mustafa Kamil Murad, to a review of the opinion opposed to the Consultative

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Assembly decree. This editorial said: "The Socialist Liberal Party experience in the latest Consultative Assembly elections has proved, through actual application of the system of lists based on an absolute majority, that the experiment was a failure; all Liberal Party candidates in all precincts without exception lost. Indeed, the party faced extreme difficulty in persuading its members to enter their names on party lists in the governorates because they were convinced that the loss had been determined previously and in advance. Had it not been for the system of appointment to the Consultative Assembly, not one person outside the National Party would have entered this assembly, and the assembly members would have all been from that party. Our dear comrade Fikri Makram 'Ubayd, deputy prime minister, along with our dear comrade Counsellor Hilmi 'Abd-al-Akhir, minister of state for People's Assembly affairs, have undertaken to defend the government draft. Their thinking revolved about a single point, which is that a party that does not obtain an absolute majority of the votes of the voters does not have the right to lead political activity among the masses. That is strange thinking, since we were not discussing the leadership of political activity and who it should go to--we were discussing something else, which was the right of minority parties to occupy local council seats in the proportion by which their lists obtain votes. However, we differ with them and with the National Party over the principle of election by lists according to absolute majority, since that is something which is at variance with the thinking behind lists based on proportional representation and it is at variance with the practice applied in every democratic country adopting this system. The Liberal Party was defeated on the amendment to this article, the opinion of the National Party prevailed, and the subject on approval and ratification of this law is still before the People's Assembly and President Anwar al-Sadat."

Commenting on current government tendencies to strike out at the opposition, Mr Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, secretary general of the National Progressive Unificationist Grouping Party, also declared, "In every country of the world, the stability of democracy depends on the existence of a real majority party which is confident in itself and its majority and does not resort to exceptional methods against the opposition, because it is the majority party which can confront the opposition in the various media, without monopolizing the media. There is no true, stable majority party which can exercise a policy by laws which have not yet been aired in referenda and hold elections through absolute lists the likes of which have not been seen in the world. We must understand that the future of politics in Egypt is not open to jest--there are real forces which reject this activity. Political forces exist on the Egyptian street, and they existed before the era of parties. I would like to say one final word, which is that to proceed to smash the opposition is a gamble whose consequences one cannot calculate."

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LEBANON

ISRAEL, SYRIA SEEN AS DESTABILIZING THE COUNTRY

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 3-9 Mar 81 pp 25-28

[Article: "The Israeli-Soviet Agreement in the Lebanese Game of Fear"]

[Text] They were three: a Palestinian leader, one of the commanders of Fatah; a Phalangist official, one of the members of the Political Bureau; and a Lebanese reporter who volunteered to arrange the meeting. It was about 5 p.m., and the sun of Beirut was setting in the sea while the tormented capital was settling down before nightfall.

The three sat in a cramped room in an apartment in the al-Hamra' Street in west Beirut. It appeared at first that caution was the master of the situation. A few days before the scheduled meeting a mined car had exploded in al-Ashrafiyah (East Beirut) claiming scores of victims. One day later [another] mined car exploded in Ra's Beirut (the western side of the capital). A number of innocent people lost their lives in that incident too. The streets are spattered with blood, and hearts are troubled.

The meeting began with a silence as heavy as the silence of the grave. The reporter realized that he had to break through the psychological barrier which separated the two men. He had to say something, so he tried to improvise an agenda. He said, "The war in Lebanon has been raging for 5 years. This war is cruel to everyone, Lebanese and Palestinians. People are dying every day for no reason. Neither the cause of Lebanon nor the Palestinian cause gains by their death. The Lebanese people know this and so do the Palestinians. They know that Israel is the first and foremost beneficiary. Is it not possible in the light of this conviction to achieve a coexistence formula between the Lebanese question and the Palestinian question while awaiting the comprehensive solution to the crisis of the region?"

The Palestinian leader began talking and said, "Had we not gone into the mountains of Lebanon, this would have been possible. We made many mistakes in the battle of al-Jabal because every bullet we fired into the Christian villages left deep wounds that have not yet healed. Today, we

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are only a few kilometers from Bikfayya (the town of Pierre al-Jumayyil, the president of the Phalangist party). The Christians felt that danger was invading them in their own home town, and they felt that their very being was actually being threatened. They turned from a timid cooperation with Israel to a blatant coordination with it, and Israel came into the Lebanese crisis as a party after having been until that time a pressure factor."

The reporter asked, "What is the role of Damascus in the Lebanese war?"

The Palestinian official replied, "Please excuse me from talking about Damascus. We in Fatah have been engaged in a silent battle with the Syrian government ever since our movement came into being as a fighting force. The Syrians want to control the Palestinian decision one time through the al-Sa'iqah organization, one time through the Syrian deterrent forces and many times by manipulating the conflicts of the Lebanese crisis. They brought us out of al-Jabal under the slogan of unifying Lebanon. Today they are in Lebanon to prevent this unification. They came for peace, but they furthered the causes of war. They came to protect Lebanon from division, and the result was that division has become a fact in Lebanon while Israel has penetrated into Lebanon. Today we stand between two oppressive forces: the Syrian force and the Israeli force with its Lebanese allies."

No Choice

The Phalangist official said, "I did not come here to lie to you. I came to say what we in the Phalangists are really thinking. It may be that conveying this truth may help us achieve some [sort of] dialogue. The truth is that in our ranks feelings against you, the Palestinians, are strong. We are convinced that it is necessary to continue the war with you until you leave Lebanon or stop interfering in Lebanese affairs. Lebanon cannot bear the Palestinian burden alone. Either you leave or Lebanon will die. We have chosen to fight for survival, and you in turn have to make your choice."

The Palestinian official laughed coldheartedly and said, "What you are saying does not surprise me. We, the Palestinians, know that many Arab regimes want to get rid of us so they can be comfortable. Lebanon, of course, is one of those regimes. However, we are staying in Lebanon until the Palestinian flag flies over Palestine. We are staying with our weapons to defend ourselves. We know what you are saying quite well. Therefore, we are not prepared to lay down [our] weapons. There are many Arabs who would like to see us disarmed, and there are many Lebanese who would like us to be weak. But we will resist that test because we are being threatened. We know that Lebanon is not the only country that is responsible for our cause so as to bear the full responsibility for it, but today we have no choice."

The reporter asked, "Do you believe that the proposed independent

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Palestinian state on part of the land of Palestine is feasible in the foreseeable future?"

The reply of the Palestinian official was surprising. "We know that this is a verbal plan. But what do we tell our people? Do we tell the Palestinian fighter that we've despaired of the world recognizing our rights? Do we tell ourselves that we are staying in Lebanon? Do we tell the Lebanese people, 'Excuse us; we are permanent guests and we have no hope of going back [to our country] in a quarter century or even in half a century?' We realize that Israel does not want to give up the West Bank and Gaza, but we are trying to force ourselves, as a party, into any dialogue that pertains to our cause. Do you want us to give up? Our surrender would mean that we would stay where we are, and this is what Israel and its allies want."

The Phalangist official said, "If the plan for the Palestinian state were a realistic plan, we would have supported it. But the information we have from the sources of the Israeli decision indicates that this plan is not achievable in the foreseeable future. We chose to fight the Palestinians and we have no other decision to make. We do not want to sacrifice our country so that all the Arab fronts would become calm at our expense. In any case you will not win your case if Lebanon ceases to exist."

Silence prevailed again. The glasses of tea that were brought in gave the meeting [some sense of] congeniality. The atmosphere eased a little with a cigarette from here and a cigarette from there. The Palestinian official began to speak and said, "You in the Phalangists know that you cannot throw us out of Lebanon. We know the extent of your weapons and the number of your fighters, and you know the extent of our weapons and the number of our fighters. Furthermore, those in power in Moscow and in Washington are observing the situation closely and they will not allow us or you to arm ourselves selectively. Our artillery and yours have almost the same range. Most certainly neither can reach the heart of Israel. It is evident that the Americans and the Soviets are fighting in Lebanon. They do not want war to break out in the region because oil is flammable and because the safety of Israel is a paramount consideration. The war of Lebanon is a possible war in the absence of impossible wars. But the weapons that we have and the weapons that you have cannot settle any battle. The evidence for this lies in the fact that 6 years of war did nothing to advance or hinder the balance of powers in general. You are in your positions; we are in our natural positions; and Israel is on the border, biting off a section here and another there. There are "red lines" between the Syrian troops and the Israeli troops that have become well-known. So is the case between us and you. The problem is that simple."

And here the Phalangist official raised a question. "Do you believe that the Syrians would accept a Phalangist-Palestinian dialogue that would take place behind their backs?"

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The Palestinian official replied, "Of course not. In 1976 when the war was at its peak we were about to sign an agreement with you in Juniyah (the Christian side), and the Syrians interfered to prevent this agreement from being signed. Then they interfered more than once to impede the liaison committees and then the dialogue commissions. We ought to find out whether or not the Syrians want to have Lebanon divided. We ought to find out whether or not they are encouraging the establishment of a sectarian Maronite state in a fragmented Lebanon. The aspirations of the Syrians in north and east Lebanon are well-known. I am referring to 'Akkar and al-Biqah'. The Israelis support this plan because it would enable them to lay their hands on part of south Lebanon about whose waters they have had aspirations ever since the state of Israel came into existence. It may be that the Americans are the only ones so far who are rejecting this plan. But will the Arabs accept it, and will the Arabs impose a solution?"

Three Changes

This dialogue is 1 year old. It was not the first Phalangist-Palestinian dialogue [that took place] since the war of Lebanon began, and it will not be the last. I have interposed it here as a reminder to the parties of the ongoing struggle in Lebanon and as a sketch of a preliminary picture of the features of the Lebanese crisis in preparation for answering the major question: Where does Lebanon turn after 6 years of war?

We begin by saying that 1980 came to an end with three major changes that are directly or indirectly related to the Arab-Israeli struggle and the Lebanese crisis.

--The Syrian-Soviet Security Treaty was signed in 1980. This means that the Syrian presence in Lebanon was no longer an "Americanized" Soviet presence, taking circumstances into consideration, but that it had rather become a blatant Soviet presence that served a clear Soviet strategy. Syrian-Soviet relations have entered into a new phase that will inevitably have an effect on Syrian conduct in Lebanon. What happens between Damascus and Moscow will inevitably have its negative or positive effects on what happens between Damascus and Beirut.

--There was also a change last year in the U.S. administration and in its directions. The new U.S. president entered the White House under the slogan of stopping Soviet expansionism. This expansion is not confined to Europe, southeast Asia and the United States itself, but it rather goes beyond the traditional strategic sectors to the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea [region], the Arab-Israeli struggle and the Lebanese crisis in particular and the future of the Syrian role in Lebanon.

--The third change in the Lebanese crisis was an internal one. The Maronite-Israeli alliance was able to utilize the recent interlude of time, in the absence of a lawful Lebanese resolution and lawful Lebanese

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institutions, in establishing the nucleus of a Maronite mini-state with Israeli support. This mini-state has begun setting up its own institutions and infrastructures while it waits to proclaim itself an independent, separate entity when circumstances permit.

Implicit Alliance

What is no longer a secret is the fact that this Maronite entity has developed and has begun to grow--radio and television [stations], a military and a civilian airport, universities, a shadow government, universal conscription and the complete arming [of citizens]--within sight of the Syrian deterrent forces and under their protection. Some people cite one proof after another to affirm that there is some kind of Phalangist-Syrian understanding on specific divisive steps that are to be taken for purposes whose full implications have not yet become quite clear.

Phalangist officials do not deny the fact that the Syrian deterrent forces make their task easier and that they do in fact sometimes interfere to back their political decisions in their regions. We mention in this regard that a Phalangist delegation had gone to Damascus late last summer with a draft statement that had been approved by the Phalangist Political Bureau. The essence of that statement was that the Phalangists were fully prepared to break their relations with Israel in preparation for holding an intra-Lebanese dialogue. The delegation returned from the Syrian capital stunned, conveying to the president of the Phalangists the details of a dialogue that took place between the delegation and Syrian officials. The gist of that dialogue was this: "You are not required to break up your ties with Israel at this stage. Continue your contacts with Israel; there is no need for such a statement."

It seemed evident to the Phalangists that the Syrian presence in some regions of Lebanon acquired "its legality" to some extent from the existing cooperation between the Christian militias and Israel. [It also seemed evident] that this presence, which appears to oppose Israel in Lebanon, gave the Syrian government an opportunity to appear as a defender in front of the Arab world and it also gave it in its international relations an advanced position in the struggle with Israel. What is required then is that the Israeli remain in Juniyah and in al-Ashrafiyah so that the Syrians can stay where they are. This is what the "balancing" game in the Lebanese war requires. This is how Damascus is extending a hand to Lebanon so it can get out of its internal isolation.

The Phalangists utilized this situation in their expansion on the land. They amassed several hundred fighters in a military operation that culminated in the assassination of Deputy Tony Franjiyyah, the son of former president Sulayman Franjiyyah in his northern town. The Syrians, who learned of the operation, did not interfere to prevent it, but they did object to its consequences in their media. Afterwards the Syrians left their positions in east Beirut and its suburbs to the forces of the

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Lebanese army which took up these positions under Phalangist conditions or rather with Phalangist protection. The Phalangist party then proceeded to eliminate [the army's] local allies so it would have the only political decision making power in the Christian regions. The Phalangist party did get what it wanted. A Phalangist delegation visited Damascus last summer to ask that a number of Phalangist detainees be released from Syrian prisons, and most of them were released. When the Lebanese forces (the Christian militias) clashed with elements of the Lebanese army in 'Ayn al-Rummanah, a suburb of east Beirut, the clash ended with the withdrawal of the Lebanese army and [the establishment of] Phalangist control over the area.

There is another common denominator between the Syrians and the Phalangists: to impede the state's lawful institutions. It is evident that the Phalangists' justification for protecting their regions and for disposing of [matters] within their capabilities is the inability of the state to ensure such protection. It is also clear that the political justification for the continued Syrian presence in Lebanon is the fact that the Lebanese government is still incapable of controlling the situation and that Israel is present in Lebanon. Thus, both the Phalangist party and Damascus [find themselves] in the same foxhole with regard to impeding the role of the lawful authority because strengthening that role would impede both of their roles.

The need for open cooperation between the Syrians and the Phalangists emerged in a few circumstances. This led to a blatant "distortion" [of the truth] in the Phalangist media that may be observed in at least two phenomena. The first is in the text of the statements that are issued by the Lebanese forces (the Christian militias) about the semi-daily clashes that take place in the heart of Beirut. This text does not accuse the Syrian deterrent forces, but rather focuses on the Palestine Liberation Army. This is exactly what is happening in other cases such as those of blowing up cars. Statements that are issued contain a direct accusation of the Fatah Movement and its agents in Lebanon as well as international terrorism in general and sidestep the Syrians. It has been said that most of the cars that have been blown up in the Phalangist regions bear the mark of Syrian intelligence and the ally of the Syrian regime, former president Sulayman Franjiyyah.

Blackout on the Activities of [Muslim] Brothers

The second phenomenon is the silence of the Phalangist media, especially the Voice of Lebanon, on news about the Muslim Brothers inside Syria. There was a time when Phalangist radio--and this was a principal factor in increasing the number of its listeners--was carrying daily news about the clashes between the Muslim Brothers and the elements of Syrian intelligence. But suddenly this information activity ceased [even] as the Brothers' operations increased. This was about 6 months ago. It turned out that "the price" for stopping [the news broadcasts] was further Syrian-Phalangist coordination and a Syrian promise to release the

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remaining Phalangist detainees who had fired shots at the Syrian army in the summer of 1978 and who had taken part in the Ihdin operation against former President Franjiyyah. The Phalangist media are still trying to dot the i's and cross the t's on the Lebanese-Palestinian conflicts as though the Syrian presence in Lebanon were that of an ally.

There are those who are saying that the Phalangists' objection to extending the term of the Syrian troops in Lebanon early this year was only superficial to save face and that they may not object to extending that term again next June because the Phalangists' position inside the country depends to a large extent on the continued Syrian presence in Lebanon in its present form, not on its absence.

Those who have kept up closely with the Syrian-Phalangist rounds of courtship are of course not surprised by the Phalangist-Soviet compliments [which have been exchanged] in the last 2 years. So far numerous meetings have taken place between the military and political general staff of the Lebanese Front and the general staff of the Soviet embassy in Beirut. The most recent of these meetings took place last week in the central office of the Phalangists between Ambassador Alexander Soldatov and al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil. The Soviet-Phalangist amity which constitutes an extension of the Syrian-Phalangist dialogue raises one question: Will the Soviet strategy and the Israeli strategy agree on breaking up Lebanon by some means that resembles partition, amputation or division, and will the new U.S. administration accept these solutions?

The answer depends upon the developments of the next 6 months, but what has been accepted so far is the fact that the Israeli role in Lebanon, which is a role that is trying to be independent of the U.S. administration in some of its regional aspects, is in agreement with the Soviet position at least in an interim fashion. The Syrian desire for the continued Phalangist cooperation with Israel is not less at this stage than the Phalangist desire for Syria's continued presence in Lebanon as a pressure force on the PLO and as a presence to justify the other intervention, the intervention of Israel.

Those who accept the Phalangist logic in Lebanon notice that the Phalangists gain more than they lose in the Syrian provocations in some Christian areas. The city of Zahlah, the largest city in al-Biqah, was not a Phalangist city. The number of Phalangists there was not more than 50--out of 50,000. But the arbitrary Syrian shelling of Zahlah before the new year--1981--made the citizens of Zahlah rally around the Phalangist party in a way that the Phalangists would not have dreamed of since they established their party before independence. The more the Phalangist media magnified the news about the Syrian "threat," the more attached the citizens of Zahlah become to the Phalangist command; and the more attached to the Israelis the Phalangists become, the stronger the Syrian role in Lebanon becomes.

And so Lebanon lives a dual game of fear: fear of Israel and fear of

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abandoning Israel on the one hand; and, on the other hand, fear of Syria and fear of abandoning the deterrent forces in the absence of the state. [Meanwhile], Lebanon continues to be gnawed at by the Israelis, the Phalangists and the Syrians at the expense of the pan-Arab struggle and the logic of history.

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LEBANON

SYRIAN MOTIVES FOR ESCALATING THE FIGHTING DISCUSSED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 10-16 Apr 81 pp 24-27

[Article: "The War of Disintegration in Lebanon; Undisguised Confrontation Behind the Red Lines"]

[Text] Despite the fierceness which characterized it, the new war in Lebanon did not take anyone by surprise. The Syrians are trying to make themselves heard in the time of American solutions, and Lebanon is the bloody laboratory for testing actions and reactions. But Lebanon as a political entity has become oppressed by its wounds and can no longer endure violent jolts. It is feared that Lebanon may shift from a stage of sharp psychological division to a stage of partition and disintegration in the Syrian-Israeli gnawing operation. Amidst the rush of possibilities and individual efforts all the masks fall, all the red lines are abolished, and large question marks are raised about the logic of major equations. What has been happening since the days of the sixth anniversary of the war in Lebanon?

When AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI devoted its last cover story to what it called "The Soviet Spring in Lebanon," it did so with the full awareness that the major bloody game that was being played in the small homeland had begun to assume the form of an open struggle between Moscow and Washington and that the tour of U.S. Secretary of State Gen Alexander Haig in the Middle East would be interpreted in Lebanon in a Soviet reaction. The Soviets want to be actual partners in the solution, which so far has been an American-Israeli-al-Sadat solution--so we would not say an Egyptian solution.

Events on the Lebanese scene were astoundingly swift in recent days in an unequal battle that may be described as an "undisguised war." The Syrians were not hiding behind the Lebanese lawful government in their military actions; their shells hit the presidential palace directly. The Lebanese forces (the Christian militias) were not denying that they were in a state of coordination with Israel. The Israeli Council of Ministers was not denying that it was coordinating [its activities] with the White House on the one hand and with Cairo on the other. While the Israeli guns of Sa'd Haddad were shelling Palestinian positions and a few cities in

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the south, Syrian forces were continuing their shelling of the city of Zahlah and the eastern sections of Beirut. The Soviets are here with the Syrian guns and missiles, and the Americans are there with the Israeli guns while the lawful government [stands] between them impotent and confused, and the Palestinians [find themselves] in a state of anticipation and expectation.

The lines then are clear, and the game that is being played is an infernal game. Lebanon which has been exhausted by the war for 6 years is no longer capable of enduring more torture. The fear of being hurled into the unknown is justifiable. There are all kinds of possibilities including the possibility of being gnawed at, of partition and of disintegration. This is because division was never a realistic possibility in the context of the existing equations and the political and demographic geography of Lebanon.

If the Lebanese will has been paralyzed as a result of the lawful government's inability to make a decision, the bets that are being placed on the moderates on this or on the other side have become bets on a major illusion. The lawful government has wasted all the Arab and non-Arab opportunities that were given to it in the last 5 years, and the decisions that are being made now are Palestinian-Syrian-Israeli decisions, no more and no less. This implies becoming entrapped in foreign plans.

Three Possibilities

All the cards are on the table, and the next few days will open up three possibilities. These are so serious that speculations about Lebanon's future appear like some kind of false prediction or forecasting of the future.

1. The first possibility is that each faction will take its share of Lebanon at the expense of all the Lebanese and the unity and independence of Lebanon: the Israelis will take the part of the south they have been dreaming about along with relative political influence in the country; the Syrians will take the part that interests them in al-Biqa' and in the hills of Lebanon to make up for "the impossible Golan;" and the Palestinians--until further notice--find no alternative to west Beirut and the remaining part of south Lebanon as the base of their struggle.

2. The second possibility is that Moscow and Washington will achieve some kind of truce that would pave the way for a settlement in Lebanon. The UN Security Council would meet and would decide to establish UN control over all of Lebanese territory in anticipation of a comprehensive solution to the Middle East through a new Geneva [conference] in which the Soviets would participate.

3. The third possibility is absolutely the worst: that the present Republic of Lebanon would fall and the battle against innocent people would continue at the expense of the Lebanese entity. All of Lebanon would then

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be turned into a forest of wolves, cannibals and large and small "Mafias" in anticipation of changes in the equations on the Middle Eastern and international scenes.

If reading the future of Lebanon in a cup of coffee appears to be some kind of prophesying the unknown, contemplating what has happened so far may help in one way or another determine the features of the future. For the first time it becomes evident that the immediate and remote objectives of the Syrian plan in Lebanon--it was for this plan that the Syrians many years ago took part in forging the Lebanese tragedy in which they are still taking part--are not different from those of the Israeli plan in Lebanon and the region. So far the Israelis have affirmed more than once that they will not return the Golan. Ever since entering Lebanon, the Syrians have been trying to "clean up" al-Biqa' in order to annex it to Syria and persuade the Syrian people that they regained Syrian territory from which they would proceed in the future to regain the Golan. Because Zahlah in al-Biqa' does not go along with that logic, it was necessary that Syria proceed from there to discipline everybody. Zahlah would be brought to its knees by heavy artillery until it becomes easy to annex it along with al-Biqa', part of north Lebanon and the adjacent hills.

So far the Israeli share has been the border strip which, with the forces of Sa'd Haddad, constitutes the primary security zone for the northern Israeli settlements. However, observers are quite aware of the fact that the Christian ghetto which Israel is trying to establish in Jabal Lubnan is, in the Israeli equation, a temporary entity that would preserve the balance with the temporary Palestinian entity on the other side of Lebanon. The price of course is paid of course by all the Lebanese, Christians and Muslims.

If, as Brig Gen Raymond Iddih says, there is in Syria, and perhaps in Lebanon, between 8,000 and 10,000 Soviet experts, the matter appears to be extremely clear, and there is no need for further independent interpretation of the nature of the struggle at the current stage. The Lebanese war is most certainly not a sectarian war, and most Lebanese Muslims have nothing to do with what is going on. It is a war of conflicting strategies on Lebanese territory in the absence of a Lebanese strategy which ceased to exist ever since the Lebanese army, the tool of sovereignty, was disbanded in the heat of the early entanglements. The Lebanese army has not been able to assert its own authority for years.

The Timing Is Syrian

The timing of the recent explosion was Syrian since it caused the Israelis to hesitate. The Syrians took action to get the Lebanese situation out of its deadlock and to modify their Lebanese lines under the new conditions which the region is experiencing. These are manifested in the following facts:

--Israel has increased its attacks on south Lebanon and has affirmed its rejection of the Lebanese army on the borders. Israel has also threatened

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- to prevent the UN forces from facilitating the mission of this army. The deployment of the Lebanese army was a decision that had been agreed to at the recent Lebanese-Syrian summit.

--The explosion came at a time when the U.S. administration was preparing a new action plan in the region. Its implementation was to begin next July apart from the Syrian position.

--The explosion was preceded by the arrival in Lebanon of Brian Urquhart the assistant to the UN secretary general, to study the possibilities for expanding the deployment of the UN forces in south Lebanon and inside Lebanon.

- --The Syrian attack came at a time when Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis was waiting for help to carry out the resolutions of the Damascus Summit. What was intended was [action] to abort the actions of the lawful government of Lebanon, to renege on promises and pledges and to hold on to the Lebanese card until further notice.

It is evident then that igniting all the fronts was a political decision not an operation to create disarray. The circumstances that surround this decision affirm that it was a well-considered decision whose purpose was to confuse the cards on the Lebanese scene and to create new formulas that the Syrian regime would utilize to its advantage in the next stage. Among these new formulas are [the following]:

- --Exerting pressure on Washington in order to include Damascus in the list of negotiators.

--Shirking at once the pledges which the Syrian regime had made to the Lebanese government.

--Warning the PLO that every attempt to go against Syrian wishes will be deterred by force in Lebanon. The evidence for this lies in the fact that Syrian shells did not spare the western region of Beirut in some cases.

--Impeding the role of the Lebanese army completely in the next stage.

The Formal Phalangist Consternation

Reviewing these facts explains to a large extent the state of consternation that prevailed in the eastern region of Beirut and among the leaders of the Lebanese Front and the state of bewilderment that came over official Lebanon. While the Syrians were talking with the Phalangists and while the Lebanese government was cooperating with Damascus to safeguard the deployment of the Lebanese army and to strengthen the components of the state and the official organizations, the Syrian military action was carried out for international considerations. It complicated everything inside and abroad, and it hurled Lebanon into an arena of major fear. [The settlement of] Syrian accounts would be a bitter pill for all the Lebanese.

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Justifications for this fear may be detected in the western media and in the Israeli media as well. A few French newspapers called attention to the fact that the Americans were wasting their time in the Middle East. They have so far refused the establishment of a Palestinian state because they are convinced it will be a new Soviet base in the region. The result is that all of Syria has now turned into a Soviet base. The Americans turned down the principle of a comprehensive solution based on a step-by-step neutralization of this or the other Arab faction in order to strengthen Israel's security. The result was that they lost Lebanon and did not win Jordan on the negotiations table. Any new partitioning in the region will not serve peace in the intermediate or the long range. The involvement of the lawful Lebanese army in the confrontation with the Syrian forces means that an American-style unification of Lebanon has become unlikely at the present time.

The Other Crossing

The question is this: Since the Syrians did cross the red line which has so far controlled their dealings with the Israeli presence in Lebanon, will the Israelis on their part react to the Syrian action?

Everything indicates that the Israeli commitments to the Christian militias include all of Christian Lebanon and not just the border strip.

But Menahem Begin, the prime minister of the Israeli government is hoping this time to execute a "master's coup" in the American field that would restore to him his popularity before the scheduled Israeli elections and tie him to the wheel of the Reagan administration for the next years.

But this red line which has been frequently discussed during the last 3 years was not drawn, not even once, with the precision that some people imagine. At the recent meeting of the Israeli Council of ministers last Sunday, a meeting that was held to look into the situation in Lebanon, the argument was sharp between those who were calling for intervention against the Syrian "expansion" and those who were asking for a green light from the U.S. president. Reporters in Tel Aviv indicated that the Israeli government had ultimately chosen to intensify its communications with the U.S. administration through Gen Haig before resorting to the use of force. The opportunity in Lebanon may be a golden opportunity for the Likud government to reveal U.S. intentions on two matters: the future of the Arab-Israeli struggle and the future of the existing alliance in the government of Israel.

There are those who are saying that ever since Ronald Reagan came to power, Israel has felt [that it had] more freedom to act inside Lebanon. The evidence for this lies in the fact that the Israeli army has increased its attacks on Palestinian bases without having these operations create the kind of reactions that used to take place during the administration of Jimmy Carter. Furthermore, the campaign against the PLO is being received with some relief in some U.S. circles because within

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those circles these campaigns are considered to be part of the war which the U.S. president has declared against what he calls "international terrorism" and the forces that are loyal to the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Is it then possible to say that a Syrian-Israeli clash is likely to happen during this period in particular and in Lebanon?

Until last Monday, evening the cutoff time for this issue of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, Israel had been satisfied with issuing something like a warning which U.S. diplomacy relayed to Damascus. Hours after this warning the Syrians expanded the circle of the shelling to include the mountains of Lebanon and most of the area that is controlled by the Phalangists. It appeared at first that the Syrian guns were not heeding the Israeli warning and that the operations which the Syrian command had decided upon in Lebanon could be a preparation for the full-scale Syrian control of Lebanese and Palestinian decisions.

It is self-evident that the internal situation in Syria as well as Syria's growing isolation on the Arab scene provide the incentives for the Syrian regime to get out of the dangerous deadlock which it has been experiencing. But Lebanon cannot continue to be an open stage for [the execution of] Syrian objectives. So far, Lebanon has been able to withstand forcible annexation attempts, and the Palestinian Resistance has been able to preserve [for itself] a broad margin of autonomous action. In the view of observers what may happen is that Lebanon may shift from the stage of psychological division which it is experiencing to a stage of geographical disintegration in the hope that the national and pan-Arab awareness of all the Lebanese will create in the next stage more cohesion that would bring back a single Lebanon with a firm Lebanese will.

Will a new Lebanon be born out of the infernal Syrian fires?

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LIBYA

NATIONALIST MOVEMENT ANNOUNCES PROGRAM

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 10-16 Apr 81 p 39

[Article: "The Libyan National Movement Announces Its Program: Pursuits and Harassments To Cease; All Political Detainees To Be Released"]

[Text] Two days ago the Libyan National Movement (the opposition) announced for the first time its program to establish a popular democratic state in Libya.

The preamble to the program stated that "Because the Libyan National Movement believes that it is necessary to organize its effort, to program its struggles and to define the national and pan-Arab goals for which the movement is fighting, it is appealing to all the people of Libya to rally around the goals that are included in the program and to achieve cohesion and solidarity to save their homeland from the tragedy under which it has been living for more than 10 years under the control of Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi's regime."

The political program which the movement is advocating stipulates the following:

1. Completing [the establishment of] real national independence by abolishing subordination to any foreigner, no matter who he is; enabling the people to enjoy that independence through their democratic institutions and their popular organizations; and ensuring public freedoms for all the citizens of our nation.
2. Repealing the various laws and decisions that were issued by the regime of the tyrant, al-Qadhdhafi, who has abused the people of our nation and squandered their acquired legitimate rights. These laws and decisions are considered in violation of the principles and the provisions of this program.
3. Removing the various forms of suppression and terror; eliminating conditions that restrain public freedoms; prohibiting the methods of arbitrary detention, torture and all forms of pursuits and harassments of the nationalist forces inside the country and abroad; considering these actions crimes; and punishing those who perpetrate them.

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4. Releasing all political detainees and permitting all expatriate citizens to return to the country voluntarily.

5. Establishing the foundations of a modern state and working to establish and to introduce political stability that is based on foundations of justice, equality and equal opportunity among all citizens in accordance with the law.

6. Preparing the masses mentally, psychologically and materially for holding general elections in which the people would express their will freely and elect their representatives to a national assembly that would be really selected, contrary to what used to happen in the elections during the bygone royal age.

7. Drawing up a modern constitution that would be the means for stabilizing conditions and establishing rights and responsibilities. This constitution would be the guide to the legislative, the judicial and the executive authorities in their pursuit of their duties. A committee made up of loyal, qualified nationalists is to draft the constitution within the first month of the change--the overthrow of the current regime. The principles of the constitution are to be derived from the spirit, the principles and provisions of this program. The draft constitution is to be presented to a constituent assembly elected by secret ballot for ratification. Popular unions and organizations are to be represented in this constituent assembly through their representatives. This is to be done within a period that does not exceed 1 year from the date on which the aforementioned committee was formed.

8. Representing the people in the governorates and in the administrative units in popular councils that are elected by the masses.

9. Putting Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi and all those who were involved with him on trial to reveal everything they have committed against our Arab people in Libya and elsewhere in the Arab states and foreign countries for the purpose of studying the cruel experience, benefiting from its lessons and learning from it to prevent its recurrence.

The economic program stipulates several clauses, the most important of which are:

1. Utilizing the principles of scientific planning which are based on objective facts. The purpose of this is to go beyond academic abstractions in [the process of] building a developed national economy so that the wheel of progress can be pushed [forward] with extraordinary force that maintains balance. [We do so] to overcome the consequences of improvisation and backwardness which prevailed in the mentality [of those] who had been planning the national economy in the royal administration and in al-Qadhdhafi's administration.

2. Working to diversify the sources of the national economy; taking advantage of the opportunity that is available with the presence of a large

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income from oil by building economic organizations that would turn the national economy from a single source economy to a balanced economy to which several branches would contribute. These branches [of the economy] ought to be developed and guided to prepare them for the role that they would play when the income from oil becomes secondary income that can be dispensed with, when that resource is depleted in the future.

3. Correcting the concept of the public sector which al-Qadhdhafi's age has divested of its content and distorted. This would be in preparation for depending on the public sector as the foundation for all the branches of the national economy by reconsidering the public sector projects in the economic positions where the public sector should not be.

4. Encouraging and guiding the private sector, especially those endeavors that assume the form of joint stock companies and limited liability companies, so that the private sector can play its part in strengthening the national and the pan-Arab economy within the plan that has been devised.

5. Establishing a mixed sector wherein the public and the private sector can cooperate and work together to rebuild the national economy and strengthen it with a mental attitude that gives precedence to the public interest over other narrow interests.

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LIBYA

BRIEFS

FOREIGN ADVISERS--According to Cairo, there are several thousand advisors to Qadhafi, representing 10 different nationalities. The Soviets lead, with about 2,000 at present, followed in order by 750 Cubans, 500 East Germans, 100 to 150 other East Europeans, 40 North Koreans and 20 Syrians. A dozen American leftists are also employed by Qadhafi's "revolutionary general staff." In Chad, the Libyans are aided by some 50 Soviets, some 20 East Germans and a number of Syrians. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 23 Mar 81 p 16] [COPYRIGHT: "Valeurs actuelles" 1981] 5157

ITALY SUPPLIES PLANES--Italy has begun to deliver to Libya the first G 222 T transport planes. Libya had ordered 20 planes of this type two years ago. The G 222, built by Aeritalia, has a transport capacity of about 10 ten tons and an operational radius ranging between 700 and 2,200 km. The original G 222 had an American General Electric engine, but for the Libyan market, because of the United States embargo, the Italians perfected a variation powered by a Rolls Royce engine. Unofficial sources in Italy say that Tripoli is currently negotiating for the purchase of a second lot of 20 G 222 T's. [Text] [Paris DEFENSE ET DIPLOMATIE in French 6 Apr 81 p 4] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 5157

COOPERATION WITH IRELAND--The Libyan Jamahiriya and the Republic of Ireland have signed a cooperation protocol in Tripoli covering the fields of health, agriculture and communications. The protocol also calls for an increase in the volume of Libyan-Irish trade exchange. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Apr 81 p 938] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 5157

COOPERATION WITH TURKEY--The secretary of the Libyan General People's Committee on Economy and Turkish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Affairs Turgut Ozal, signed a protocol agreement for bilateral cooperation on 10 March in Tripoli. It calls for cooperation between Turkey and Libya in various sectors--industrial, economic, agricultural, trade and exchange of experience. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Apr 81 p 938] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 5157

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SUDAN

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND AIDS BLUE NILE PROJECT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Apr 81 p 938

[Text] The Sudan has undertaken to repair the Blue Nile pumping networks, and it recently obtained a loan from the African Development Fund (ADF) for the purpose totaling 8.3 million UCF, or nearly 10 million dollars.

The Shasheina region, where the project financed is located, has for a number of years seen a steady decline in agricultural productivity, particularly notable in the realm of cotton growing. Thus the primary purpose of the project is to re-establish farm production yields at their earlier levels, on the one hand by repairing the whole of the installations of the Blue Nile Agricultural Corporation (BNAC) and relaunching its activities in the Shasheina region, and on the other hand, by supplying the rest of the zone covered by the BNAC with farm machinery.

The project will aid the BNAC and the Ministry of Irrigation to reorganize the cultivation of cotton, peanuts and sorghum over the area of 55,000 hectares in which the BNAC has some 18,000 tenant farmers. The components of the project financed by the ADF are the following: supply of farm machinery and equipment and purchase of vehicles and miscellaneous equipment. The total cost of the project is estimated at nearly \$67 million.

The project will be financed by the ADF, the IDA [International Development Association] and the Sudanese government. The ADF will finance the foreign exchange costs with the IDA on a parallel basis. The government will assume the costs in local currency. The execution of the project will be carried out over a period of five years and it is to be launched in 1981. Execution will be entrusted to the BNAC. The purchase of all the goods and services financed by the product of the ADF loan will be carried out by solicitation of international bids, in accordance with the ADF directives in this connection.

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SYRIA

CARLOS TO ASSIST SYRIA IN LIQUIDATION CAMPAIGN

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 10-16 Apr 81 pp 22-23

[Article: "AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI Reveals this Secret: Carlos Is in Damascus To Agree on a Plan for Liquidations Abroad"]

[Text] AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned from a confidential source that Carlos, who is well-known for operations of violence and hijacking airplanes, has been in the Syrian capital for a week under political and security seclusion.

An official invitation had been extended to Carlos by Syrian intelligence to visit Damascus. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine had acted as intermediary to ensure Syria's communications with Carlos.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI can now affirm that the purpose of this direct contact [with Carlos], which is taking place for the first time, is to look into the possibility of having Carlos and his group take part in the plan to get rid of the opposition to the Syrian regime abroad.

Carlos did actually meet with a number of the prominent staff members of the Syrian intelligence.

Preparatory communications [for this meeting] had begun since the Pakistani airplane was recently hijacked [and flown] to Damascus Airport. There, a gentleman's agreement was reached between the two sides through intermediaries to solve the airplane crisis in a manner that would preserve the "rights" and save the face of the kidnappers in return for certain "services" that Carlos would render to the Syrian regime at a subsequent time.

A decision on the principle of seeking the help of "international experts" in the area of liquidations and assassinations abroad was made at a secret staff meeting of the Syrian intelligence some time ago after it became evident to the staff that one of the stumbling blocks that is threatening the success of foreign operations was the absence of "local elements" who know the art of moving about in Europe freely and who can

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speaking foreign languages fluently. This would give them the freedom to move about, [the ability] to adjust and the opportunity to mislead and to disguise themselves. Besides, training "local elements" in the various fundamentals of liquidations abroad would require a long time, perhaps not less than 1 year.

In addition to these "stumbling blocks" the most modern "technologies" that are utilized in this regard are not readily available, especially since European police agencies succeeded in apprehending Syrian groups that had arrived recently in Europe. These groups had not succeeded in "disguising" themselves despite the fact that they were using diplomatic passports.

The quick discovery of the identities of those who committed the crime of Binan 'Isam al-'Attar also helped strengthen the belief in some Damascus circles that it was necessary to seek the aid of advanced foreign "experts" and to strengthen the means of training in the most developed technologies in this area.

The role which Carlos will be asked to play has not been known yet; nor has the nature of "the services" that he will perform [been revealed]. But confidential sources told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that Carlos was fully apprised of the situation and that the importance of getting rid of the opposition and the vagrants who hurt the image of the Syrian regime abroad was also discussed with him. Briefly, Syrian intelligence reviewed with Carlos the details of "the plan" so it can be discussed from all aspects.

So far Carlos has not given a promise to participate in one form or another in "the plan," and he asked that he be given a period of time to consult with his colleagues, especially since those colleagues usually hesitate to place their expertise at the service of a particular regime, no matter what regime it was. This was what Carlos himself assured Mr Rif'at al-Asad.

On the other hand it was confirmed that Syrian agencies were presently interested in the activities of the Muslim Brothers in France following information in the French capital that their activities had recently increased.

Other information states that Mr 'Isam al-'Attar himself may move his residence to the French capital. But circles of the Islamic Cultural Center in Aachen, West Germany state that "No decision has yet been made regarding the residence of Mr al-'Attar. The matter is currently being carefully and scrupulously considered from all aspects."

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